CEOs of the acquiring firms are more likely to cancel acquisitions when the market does not react favorably to the announcement (Luo, 2005) . Using a sample of French acquisition announcements from 2000 to 2005, this paper studies the conditions under which CEOs are more willing to listen to investors. From the power typology of Finkelstein (1992), we find that CEOs with a high expertise listen to the market. Considering the strong networks of the French Elite Schools Alumni and board connections, we also find that the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete a deal in spite of a negative market reaction on acquisition announcement.
1 Introduction 1 However, empirical studies find returns close to zero or even negative for firms that acquired public targets around the M&A announcements (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001; Fuller et al., 2002) . If there is no value creation from M&As, why do acquiring firms still involve in them? According Morck et al. (1990) , acquirers managerial objectives may drive poor bidding firms performance.
The need for power determines the CEOs' motivations (Rovenpor, 1993) . When CEOs establish an external growth policy, they want to build an empire (Rhoades, 1983; Schneider and Dunbar, 1992 ) from which they boost their career and extract financial or fringe benefits. In addition, they are in search of increasing their compensation (Wright et al., 2002) . Besides, acquisitions provide opportunities for the managing for results. If CEOs anticipate insufficient results, they can improve them by acquiring profitable firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . Moreover, CEOs might decrease global risk by diversifying their firm (Morck et al., 1990) . They might push firm investments toward assets that have some relationship with their abilities (Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995) . By gearing their investments toward other sectors or specific partners, CEOs may strengthen their position in the firm. The resulting entrenchment may guarantee more security and more leeway to the CEOs, because dismissing such a CEO would be more expensive for shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . Finally, Hubris could lead CEOs to overestimate their own competence (Roll, 1986) , such that they believe they can manage target firm better than its current CEO (Gupta et al., 1997; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) . The illusion of control (Langer, 1975) may lead CEOs to overestimate the success of M&As, underestimate exogenous events, and become convinced that they can extract some benefits from the new entity. According to Malmendier and Tate (2005) , overconfident CEOs overestimate their capacity to manage the firm, yet the market does not approve such overconfident CEOs acquisitions, because they involve in the purchase of firms for more than their market value. The CEOs who display such hubris often suffer the winner's curse (Roll, 1986) . According to Brown and Sarma (2007) , CEOs motivations are meaningful only if we consider CEO dominance, which reflects CEOs ability to convince stakeholders to follow the proposed direction or impose their point of view on them. Brown and Sarma highlight that M&A activity is determined primarily by the CEO's power over the board.
The determinants of the degree to which CEOs listen to the market derive from Finkelstein's (1992) classification of CEO power, which distinguishes structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige powers. We expect that well-connected CEOs, i.e., with a high prestige power, are more willing to pursue a decision even if the market did not approve it. We consider the French context where CEOs are strongly well-networked as well through education, directorships, and non profit boards. We distinguish two formal types of French networks, the elite education and the directorship. Concerning the elite education, the major high schools to get to CEO function areÉcole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and Polytechnique (X). For the directorship, CEOs of French blue chips usually sit on each other boards. For example, Michel Pébéreau, the Chairman of BNP-Paribas and the former CEO, holds simultaneously several directorships in big French companies' board (e.g., Axa, EADS, Lafarge, Galerie Lafayette, and Total). Considering the conditions under which CEOs are more willing to listen to markets, we focus on acquisition decisions.
Using a sample of French acquisition announcements from 2000-2005, our results are consistent with Luo's (2005) result that the likelihood to complete a deal is determined by the market reaction. Secondly, we test the impact of the four types of power defined by Finkelstein (1992) on probability to complete an acquisition according to the market reaction. Structural power is negatively associated to the probability to complete an acquisition that reveals a low degree of CEO listening to the stock market. Ownership power increases the CEO's attention paid to the market. The more the CEO ownership level is, the more the CEO relies on the market signal. However, this result is not significant. Our results also suggest that expertise power leads the leader to listen to the market. Finally, considering the strong networks of the French Elite Schools Alumni, we find that the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete a deal in spite of a negative market reaction on acquisition announcement. It seems that a private information access leads the CEO to discount the market signal when making acquisition bids.
Our results corroborates the dominance of social connections among managers (Burt, 2000) The well-connected CEOs access to private information and they are less affected by performance because of the protection obtained from their network (Nguyen-Dang, 2008) . They are also more likely to associate with people to whom they are similar (McDonald et al., 2008) and take these similar acquaintances' advice to strengthen themselves in their choice. Thus, managers increase their self-confidence by confirming their beliefs according to their friends. Through our knowledge, few studies consider CEO power through acquisition activity. In recent research, Oler et al. (2007) and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) underline the CEO's impact on the firm's acquisition policy. These results do not allow us to conclude on the real CEO impact. Indeed, the activity acquisition reflects more the firm's expectations. Precisely, CEOs can be selected for the high capacity to lead M&As. We propose an original empirical study concerning the characteristics of the French context, which provides a setting marked by the predominant role of CEOs and strong networks, both of which pertain to prestige power. From a practical perspective, our investigation also provides a better understanding of the role played by CEOs in acquisition decisions and offers some answers about information gathering behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the hypotheses development. We present the data and method in Section 3, followed by our analysis of the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and offers some concluding remarks.
Hypotheses Development
Acquiring firms usually take into account investors' behavior (Luo, 2005) and particularly, CEOs listen to the market (Kau et al., 2008) . We focus on the determinants of the degree to which CEOs listen to the market. Our aim is to determine what are the mechanisms which lead CEOs to be more receptive to the signals sent by the investors. We define these determinants from the typology of Finkelstein (1992) who distinguishes structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige powers. We position our hypotheses on the basis of this classification. Concerning ownership and structural power, our expectations are unequivocal. However, concerning structural and expertise powers, literature results are mixed. Therefore, predictions are ambiguous thus we develop the different arguments. We summarize our hypotheses in figure 1.
Structural Power
Structural power refers to CEO duality, i.e, the CEO is as well the CEO of the firm as the chairperson of the board of directors. Therefore, structural power provides decisions-making power. Thus CEOs may cope with criticisms and take responsibility if their decisions are not successful (Oler et al., 2007) . We expect that structural power influences negatively, ceteris paribus, the likelihood to consummate the deal when it caused a negative market reaction.
However, Baliga et al. (1996) suggest that CEO duality may avoid the dilution of the CEO leadership by reducing the probability of overlapping between the decisions and the objectives of the management and the board. Furthermore, Baliga et al. observe that CEO duality do not create a competition between the chairman of the board and the CEO. CEO duality reduces the governance control of the board. Therefore, CEOs who are also chairman of the board rely more on their beliefs and may be more 
Ownership Power
The CEO's own financial investment in the firm's capital implies that the managers may be directly involved in the corporate investment decisions. Managerial ownership contributes to internal mechanism to reduce agency costs, i.e., managers with a low ownership power maximize their own utility at the expense of the value creation of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The relationship between the CEO behavior towards a negative market reaction at an investment announcement date and his ownership concerns is relatively intuitive. CEOs that are concerned by high ownership power have less diversified situation. Thus the more CEOs have assets in the firm; the more they will avoid risky strategy. Ownership power determines positively the degree to which CEOs listen to the market.
Hypothesis 2: CEO ownership power decreases the probability of completing a deal that causes a negative market reaction at its announcement date.
Expertise Power
Expertise power refers to the capacity to foresee, better and quicker than competitors, the market behavior. Experienced CEOs are more able to interpret market signals. Previous literature often considers tenure (Walters et al., 2007) and CEO prior acquisition experience (Oler et al., 2007) . At the beginning of their careers, CEOs often hope to grow the firm, which implies adopting more risky strategies, without focusing necessarily on market reactions. Longer CEO tenure instead corresponds to a decrease of the CEO's propensity to acquire information about the process of acquisition, development, and growth (Hambrick and Fukotomi, 1991; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Audia et al., 2000; Kroll et al., 2000) . Those CEOs who are about to retire, have an even higher risk aversion (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) . Moreover, a longer tenure may result in stronger control of the board. These elements all refer to the status quo of CEOs (Hambrick and Fukotomi, 1991; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and suggest that CEOs with a long tenure may not complete a deal to which the market reaction has been negative.
"There is little reason to expect that a particular individual bidder will refrain from bidding because he has learned from his own past errors. Although some firms engage in many acquisitions, the average individual bidder/manager has the opportunity to make only a few takeover offers during his career. They may convince themselves that the valuation is right and that the market does not reflect the full economic value of the combined firm." (Roll, 1986, p199) . We consider that the number of acquisitions done by the CEO could be more reliable for estimating the expertise power in the acquisition policy context but that this number is not enough for learning from his past acquisitions. CEOs will base themselves more on their intuition. 
Prestige Power
Prestige power relates on the advantages that CEOs obtain from their social networks and connections, which play a considerable role in the boards' composition.
The French CEO market is characterized by two managerial elites, namely, CEOs from theÉcole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and the Polytechnique (X). These schools provide the only access to ministerial secretary positions, which are very connected.
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These civil servants, regardless of the length of their careers, often get ap-2 The best students from Polytechnique often enter Les Mines or Pont et Chaussées to become high-ranking civil servants and those from ENA often get jobs with Inspection des Finances, La Cour pointed to corporate boards or even take CEO posts in notable firms (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1995) . For example, a high-ranking civil servant of the French State has been recently appointed CEO of BPCE, one of the biggest European banks. The appointment of a high-ranking civil servant in the head of big French firms is frequent. In 2008, 50% of the CAC40 CEOs came from the ENA or X (Dameron, 2008) . Education-based networks exist not only because of the comradeship of the members of experience during their studies but also as a result of the different meetings in which they participate for their title promotion or the entries in their address books. Moreover, by participating on other firms' boards, CEOs can extend their networks. Seats on these boards enable them to access better quality information and establish partnerships.
The consequences of this power are multiple. First, prestige power likely increases the CEOs' ego and grants them more confidence on their judgments. According to Barber et al. (1995) , CEO network ties among managerial elites increase the likelihood of an acquisition event, because CEOs who belong to favored networks overestimate the accuracy of their own judgment, even in the face of negative market reactions. Second, Beckman and Haunschild (1998) distinguish two types of acquisition information: private information (e.g., network, friendship) and public (e.g., reports, communication). Private information has greater impact on CEOs' decisions, because it suggests a competitive advantage. Well-connected CEOs have access to private information that may encourage them to pursue decisions disapproved of by the market. Third, prestige power grants CEO more legitimacy and endows them with an important persuasive capacity during negotiations. For example, CEOs might develop friendly relations with the board of directors to divert their attention away from disagreeable elements and to obtain their consent (Lauenstein, 1977) . Fourth, their networks protect connected CEO from lay offs and help them find new jobs more easily (Nguyen-Dang, 2008) . As a consequence, they take more risks and they complete an acquisition even if the market does not approve it. Figure 2 shows the double informative relationship between the acquirer and the market during an acquisition announcement period. The characteristics of acquisition (the bidding firms, the target firms, the mean of payment, the number of competitors, ...) are interpreted by the market. The market sends its opinion through its reaction. Other types of information are considered during this investment period and more particularly when networks are important. On one hand, networks can provide an informational advantage to the bidder comparing to the market. On the other hand, research on decision making conclude that managers assign greater weight to personal sources than to impersonal sources (McDonald and Westphal, 2003) . People often persevere in their beliefs and persist despite negative performance outcomes. They seek information from sources that are more likely to affirm those beliefs and to avoid sources that are more likely to disconfirm them (confirmation bias). Thus networks can help CEOs to confirm their initial judgment and he will not revise correctly his decision.
Hypothesis 4: CEO prestige power increases the probability of completing a deal which that causes a negative market reaction at its announcement date. 
Sample Selection
We collected a sample of M&A announcements from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) database. The announcements we gather all satisfy the following criteria: (1) They occurred between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2005; (2) both the acquiring and target firms are publicly traded; (3) the acquiring firms are French; (4) the deal value is e1 million or higher; (5) the expected percentage owned by the acquirer after the transaction is at least 50%, and (6) the acquiring firms appear in the SBF250 index between 2000 and 2005. 3 The stock price data come from Datastream. We hand-collected the CEOs' characteristics using Who's Who and the Factiva database. We obtained information about the characteristics of the corporate governance of acquiring firms from Dafsalien, and we hand-collected the corporate governance characteristics of the acquiring firms to construct a corporate governance index. Financial statements come from Thomson Financial. Data unavailability in some cases required us to delete some acquisition announcements. Our final sample also does not include multiple acquisition announcements by an acquiring firm on the same day, because the information sent to the market may overlap. Thus, we obtain a final sample of 205 acquisition announcements. Table 1 and figure 3 reveal the frequencies of completed and uncompleted acquisitions for our sample of 205 acquisitions announcements between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2005. Approximately 76% of the sample, or 156 announcements, achieved success during the six-year period, which is generally consistent with the overall M&A market (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008) . At end of 2000, the financial crisis corresponds to a decline in acquisitions (Kau et al., 2008) . Moreover, we only identify 16 acquisition announcements in 2003. We also observe that our sample contains 134 
Figure 3: Acquisition Announcements Frequency
This figure presents the year-by-year acquisition announcements frequencies. The minimum deal value is e1 million, the minimum percentage of shares that acquiring firms sought to own after the transaction is 50%, and all deals were announced between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2005. 90.00
Percent of Completed Acquisition
Acquisition Announcements % of Completed Acquisition acquiring firms. It means that each bidding firm announces, on average, about 1.5 acquisitions.
Method
To examine the relationship between CEO power and the probability of M&A's success, we estimate the following probabilistic model:
where ACQ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition is completed, and 0 otherwise; and X is the vector of independent variables, including those related to the market reaction to the acquisition announcements, CEO power, and the control variables pertaining to corporate governance, the deal, and the financial statements of acquiring firm (See the Appendix 1 for the variables description). Luo (2005) suggests that the market reaction to M&A announcements provides a means to predict if the deal will be completed. To measure the CEO's ability to complete an acquisition, despite negative market reactions, we include a market reaction variable to the acquisition announcements (CARi). We calculate the returns from the event study methodology and use the market-adjusted returns model to estimate the abnormal component of returns (AR) of stock i on day t:
Market Reaction to M&A Announcements
where R i,t indicates the returns of stock i at time t, R m,t is the market return at time t, α i reveals the abnormal return of stock i, and t = 0 is the announcement date.
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We use the returns of the SBF250 index as the measure of market returns, though the results are robust against various return measures. Following Brown and Warner (1985) , we estimate the coefficients α and β of stock i over the period from 300 days to 15 days before the acquisition announcement. Then we estimate the cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms over the 7 trading days that surround the announcement dates [-3 days; +3 days]:
This window of 7 trading days helps us control for possible news leaks and allows investors time to gather additional information.
CEO Power
We use proxies of structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige powers. Structural power uses a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of the acquiring firms also is the chairman of the board (CEO Duality). To test whether CEO has ownership power, we include the percentage of equity owned by CEO (CEO Ownership) and a dummy variable that equals one if CEO is the founder or the heir of founder family (Family Firm). We use CEO tenure (Tenure) and prior acquisition experience (Acquisition Experience) as proxies of the CEO's expertise power. Finally, we consider two proxies to measure the prestige power of the CEOs. First, we note the networks resulting the CEOs' education in GrandesÉcoles. We include a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is a graduate ofÉcole Nationale d'Administration or Polytechnique (Elite Education). Second, we take into account the networks that stem from the CEOs' presence on the other firms' boards. The corporate directorships variable equals the number of CEO directorship (Outside Boards). Our consideration is not exhaustive and excludes some networks in France (e.g., La Franc-Maçonnerie, Le Siècle) the members of these latter networks are difficult to identify.
Control Variables
We also include independent variables that control corporate governance, financial statements, and deals, drawing mostly from finance literature. Following Gompers et al. (2003) 's work, Bollaert et al. (2009) developed a French corporate governance index (CG Index) whose items reflect the specificities of corporate governance in the French context. The items used are merged into four categories: ownership structure, board composition, board mechanisms, and transparency. The category ownership structure includes three items: ultimate owners, family control, and presence of a blocking minority. The category board composition refers to the former Figure 4 : Networks in CAC40 Boards of "ENA" or "Polytechnique" of CEO. The category board mechanisms contains items on the existence of governance, remuneration, audit or nomination committees. The category transparency involves items negatively perceived for the firm's transparency: absence of details concerning the board evaluation, charter unavailable, and poor information about the directors' backgrounds. Following the study of Gompers et al., we add, for each firm, one point (+1) for every characteristic that reduces shareholder rights. The higher score, the weaker is governance. We also use the size of board of directors (Board Size) to control monitoring mechanisms that supervise the acquisition decisions of the CEOs. We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between board size and the degree of board monitoring, so we also adopt a quadratic form of the board size variable in our analysis. Firms with a large board benefit from protective governance (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008) . However, the oversized boards are less likely to control effectively CEOs (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . Considering the leverage of the acquiring firm (Leverage) (Harford, 1999) , we expect an inverse relationship between this level and the probability of an acquisition's success. The size of a firm may also have an impact on acquisitions. Bigger firms are more likely to complete an acquisition, therefore we use market value (Size) as a measure of firm size. Greater performance increases the probability of completing an acquisition (Morck et al., 1990) , prompting us to use return on equity (ROE) to measure the performance of acquiring firms. The method of payment to pay the transaction could exert an important impact. A cash deal may signal to the market that the acquiring firm's stock prices are undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Cash acquisitions often get consummated more quickly (Datta et al., 1992) . Therefore, we expect that the effect of a dummy variable -equal to 1 if the acquisition uses cash (Cash) -is positive on the probability of acquisition success. Finally, we include dummy variables to control for acquisitions due to economic and technological shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005) . The frequency with which CEOs serve as the chairman is high (0.70), though the mean value is lower (0.67) for completed acquisitions than for uncompleted acquisitions (0.80). The differences in both the mean and median values of this variable are significant at the 5% level.
Approximately 18% of CEOs are founders or heirs of the founder's family. For completed acquisitions, this percentage is 13%, and it rises to 33% for uncompleted acquisitions. We also find, on average, that the portion of capital owned directly by the CEO equals 0.98% in our sample. This CEO ownership is 0.27% in the subsample of completed acquisition but reaches 3.22% for uncompleted acquisitions. This difference also is significant.
The average of CEO tenure is 7.11 years, and prior CEO acquisition experience involves an average of 21.87 acquisitions. The mean tenure of CEOs is significatively longer for uncompleted acquisitions (9.20 years) than for completed acquisitions (6.45 years).
The frequency with which CEOs is a graduate of elite schools (ENA or X) is 51%. For completed acquisitions, 55% of CEOs come from ENA or X, whereas this percentage drops to 39% for the subsample of uncompleted acquisitions. On average, CEOs hold 11.02 directorships.
Almost half of the acquiring firms' stock experience a negative CAR during the 7-day window surrounding the announcement of an acquisition. This result is consistent with previous studies of the wealth creation for acquiring firms' shareholders around M&A announcements. This result suggests that the market reaction to acquisition announcements may predict whether the acquiring firms will complete the deal later.
With regard to the corporate governance variables, we find that completed announcements usually involve acquiring firms with lower corporate governance scores. The mean (median) board size is 17.71 (18), 18.39 (18), and 15.76 (16) for the full, completed and uncompleted samples, respectively. That is, the board size for the subsample of completed acquisitions is significatively larger than that for uncompleted acquisitions. We also find that for the subsample of completed announcements, acquiring firms are larger and have a lower leverage, which suggests that it may be easier to complete a deal if firms are less financially constrained.
In table 4, we report the correlation among our variables.
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Among the correlations, the educational background tends to have large boards (0.54) although it is negatively correlated with the CEO founder or heir of the founding family. There is a positive correlation between CEO tenure and three others CEO power variables: CEO duality, CEO founder, and CEO ownership. The proxies of expertise power are also correlated (0.31). We find that firms with large boards are not associated with a CEO founder (or heir the founding family) and a high CEO ownership. . CEO Duality is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO also holds the board chair, and 0 otherwise. Family Firm is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if CEO is also the founder or heir of the founder family, and 0 otherwise. CEO Ownership is the proportion of outstanding shares held by the CEO in the firm. Tenure is the number of years the individual has been CEO of the firm. Acquisition Experience is the number of M&As previously made by the CEO. Elite Education is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO has a degree from an elite French school (ENA or X), and 0 otherwise. Outside Boards is the number of CEO directorships. CARi, expressed as a percentage, is the cumulated abnormal return surrounding M&A announcement of the acquiring firm. CG Index is the corporate governance index. Board Size is the number of directors on the board. Size, expressed in million euros, is the product of shares outstanding and share price. Leverage, expressed as a percentage, is equal to debt divided by assets. ROE, expressed as a percentage, is equal to the result per share divided by returns. Cash is a dummy variable equals 1 if the acquisition is paid for by cash only, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Completed Acquisition 4.2.1 Completed Acquisition and Market Reaction
Luo (2005) finds that the market reaction around M&A announcements enables to predict the success of that acquisition. Relying on Luo's (2005) results, we test whether the bidding firms later consummate the deal after recognizing the market's reaction to the acquisition announcement. Our results are consistent with Luo's (2005) result. As we show in table 5, the probability of success of the acquisition decreases significatively when the market reaction to the announcement is worse. We also anticipated a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between the board size and the probability to complete a deal. In our model, we use the quadratic form of board size and we find that it is indeed significantly negatively related to the probability to complete an acquisition. The point of inflection in the relationship between the board size and the probability to complete deal is approximatively 20 directors. We thus propose extending this model to investigate the effects of the CEO's characteristics. Although the industry and year dummy variables are included in our model, for the sake of aesthetics, we do not present them in our results.
Completed Acquisition, Market Reaction and CEO Power
In table 6 Panel A, we estimate a logistic model in which the dependent variable is the probability that the acquiring firms consummate an acquisition; we include CEO characteristics among the independent variables. To take into account the market reaction, we also use a set of interactive terms. Because we define CEO power as his or her ability to complete a deal even when the market reaction is negative, we focus here on the results involving the interactive variables. We find negative and significant relationship between structural power and the probability of completing a deal. As a result, we accept Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1". We argue that CEOs who are also chairman of the board rely more on their beliefs and may be more overconfident. Moreover, the likelihood of completed acquisitions increases with one of our proxies for ownership power; that is, the percentage of capital owned by the CEO has not a significant positive impact on the completion likelihood of an acquisition, not in support of Hypothesis 2. This result suggest that the ownership power determines if managers' actions subsequent to an acquisition announcement do not learn from market reaction. CEO tenure also has a positive effect, in support of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 3'. Expertise power affects positively the degree to which CEOs listen to the market. Finally, our main result pertains to the strong relationship between prestige power and the likelihood of completing an acquisition. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported. CEOs with elite education and a board connections privilege their acquaintances' advice over market signals. Table 1 shows that the full sample of 205 acquisition announcements is relatively unbalanced. Thus, we present a confusion matrix in table 6 Panel B. The matrix of confusion suggests the accuracy of our model. It correctly predicts 170 announcements, with an average rate of 82.9%.
Robustness Tests

Heteroscedasticity
To take into account the potentiel heteroscedasticity issue of abnormal returns, we standardize abnormal returns by their standard deviation on estimation period (Patell, 1976; Boehmer et al., 1991) . We calculate the standardized cumulated abnormal returns:
where σ AR i,t indicates the standard deviation of abnormal returns calculated on estimation period of stock i and N is the number of days contained in the event period. We provide the results of our regression in table 7. Thus, before capturing the relative strength of the signal, we find that our results are consistent with our previous results. The market signals enable CEOs to gain experience. We also observe that structural and prestige powers increase the probability of an acquisition whose the announcement causes a negative market reaction although expertise power increases this likelihood.
Sample Splitting
To test the robustness of our results, we also split our sample into two groups according the market signals. We provide the results of these regressions in table (8). We only keep the significant control variables in table 6. Our results are also consistent with the previous conclusions. For the subsample of negative market reaction, we observe that prestige power increases the probability to complete a deal. For the subsample of positive market reaction, our results suggest that structural and prestige powers decrease the probability to consummate a deal later and expertise power decreases it.
Collinearity Issues
To test the potential collinearity issues, we examine the associations between the CEO characteristics and the market reaction variables. We test the relevance of our model by considering if CEO power characteristics determine the market reaction around the acquisition announcements. We measure the frequency of variables relative to CEO power according to the level of the market reaction of acquiring firms around the announcement. To determine the existence of a contingency, we calculate statistics that test the null hypothesis of no association. From table 9, we conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between the level of CEO power and the market reaction. These results are consistent with the absence of correlation between the market reaction variable and the CEO power characteristics suggested by table 4. 
Conclusion
Since the role of CEO power remains contested position within firms, this study brings up the CEO power question in the acquisition activity. We studied the CEO listening degree to market reactions to acquisition announcements. Empirical studies conclusions about this question are mixed. According to Luo (2005) , firms learn from the market and are more willing to do it when the market is better informed than itself. Kau et al. (2008) support that managers listen to the market especially when they are likely to be concerned by agency costs. Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) results suggest that CEOs rely more on private information than on the consensus. We considered the different conclusions and analyzed the determinants of the CEOs' attention paid to the to the market's assessment at the acquisition announcement.
The listening determinants we used are based on the CEO power classification offered by Finkelstein (1992) , which includes structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige powers. We studied the French context because it is characterized by strong networks through education or directorships which enable us to obtain an original prestige power measure. We based our empirical analysis on a sample of French acquisition announcements from 2000 to 2005.
We assume that structural power can increase as well as decrease the probability to complete a deal when the investors has been negatively reacted. The CEOs being the chairman of the board tend to be more overconfident because of their position in the firm. Ownership power leads the CEO to share the market's opinion. CEOs concerned by high financial implications are more risk-averse. This result is consistent with the agency costs theory. According to CEO tenure, we expect that CEOs take less risk and learn from their past errors with a high tenure. In another way, we assume that their acquisitions experience determines the significant learning process. Our results confirm our hypothesis and they suggest that prestige power is associated with a high degree of listening to stock market. Finally, we support our major hypothesis that networks play a considerable role in the decision process. In fact, our results show that CEO prestige power increases the likelihood that a deal will be completed although not approved by the market investors.
The financial implications of the CEO behavior towards the market reaction during the acquisition announcement period were beyond the scope of our paper. Are wellconnected managers a benefit or a cost to the companies they manage? This remains to be discussed. From the one hand, networks improve the flow of information thus reducing the asymmetry information among managers. From the other hand, social connections can lead to lower monitoring and more freedom for the managers which can be used for self-serving, and the detriment of shareholders' wealth. We will extend this work by considering the financial implications of acquisitions made by well-connected CEOs. 
